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Kenneth McK. Norrie, Strathclyde Law School 
 
Introduction 
It was not surprising that one of the earliest issues to be litigated under the 
&KLOGUHQ¶V+HDULQJV6FRWODQG$FWZDVZKRZRXOGEHHQWLWOHGWREHWUHDWHGDV
D³UHOHYDQWSHUVRQ´ 7KHPDWWHUKDG frequently exercised the higher courts ± even 
the Supreme Court ± in the years immediately prior to the 2011 Act, where the issue 
was analysed through the prism of human rights.  One of the major changes in the 
2011 Act was to narrow the definition of relevant person while at the same time to 
create a means whereby those who do not come within that definition can 
nevertheless seek ³WREHWUHDWHGDVDUHOHYDQWSHUVRQ´IRUPRVWSXUSoses of the 2011 
Act.  The definition, in s.200, leaves little room for interpretative dispute, but the new 
procedure, in ss.79-81, for deeming an individual outwith that definition to be a 
relevant person always was likely to generate dispute because the test to be 
satisfied is much more open-ended than the definition. 
 
The Test 
The test to be applied (primarily by a pre-hearing panel) is contained in s.81(3) of the 
&KLOGUHQ¶V+HDULQJV6FRWODQG$FWDQGLI LW LVPHWWKHSDQHO³PXVW´GHHPWKH
individual to be a relevant person.  The test is whether the pre-hearing panel 
³FRQVLGHUV WKDW WKH LQGLYLGXDOKDV RUKDV UHFHQWO\KDGDVLJnificant involvement in 
WKHXSEULQJLQJRI WKHFKLOG´ $VKHULIIPD\RYHUWXUQ WKHGHtermination made by the 
pre-hearing panel on this matter but, as usual with decisions of a judgmental nature, 
may not do so simply because he or she would have come to a different conclusion: 
the deemed relevant person decision can be overturned only when the sheriff is 
satisfied that the determination of the pre-hearing panel is QRW ³MXVWLILHG´$FW
s.160(3) and (4): on the meaning of this ground of appeal, see Norrie, &KLOGUHQ¶V





Reported in the Family Law Bulletin in January 2014 is the decision of Sheriff 
McCulloch from January 6: M, Appellant (2014 Fam. LB 127/7).  Here a pre-hearing 
SDQHO KDG UHIXVHG WR GHHP D WKUHH \HDU ROG FKLOG¶V JUDQGPRWKHU WR EH D UHOHYDQW
person.  The child had been removed from his mother under the terms of a child 
protection order and, at the second working day hearing, an interim compulsory 
supervision order was made, requiring the child to reside with his grandmother, 
which interim order was confirmed at the eighth working day hearing.  Around three 
weeks later the child was placed with foster carers and, a few days after that, a 
children¶V KHDULQJ UDWLILHG WKH IRVWHU SODFHPHQW  $W WKDW KHDULQJ WKH JUDQGPRWKHU
was not present, as she did not come ZLWKLQWKHVGHILQLWLRQRI³UHOHYDQWSHUVRQ´
So she required, as was her right, a pre-hearing panel to consider whether she 
should be deemed to be a relevant person for the future.  She argued that her 
involvement was significant since she had been involved with the child throughout 
his life, including him staying overnight with her every Friday, and occasionally at 
other times.  The panel, however, held that since she had not been involved in 
medical, dental or nursery decisions in respect of the child, the involvement in the 
FKLOG¶VXSEULQJLQJZDVQRW³VLJQLILFDQW´DVUHTXLUHGE\WKH$FW 
The grandmother appealed on the ground that the panel had adopted too narrow an 
approach: the significance of KHULQYROYHPHQWLQWKHFKLOG¶Vupbringing could be seen 
by the fact that she had given the mother advice on matters like inoculations, and in 
particular by the three weeks during which the child was placed with her on an 
emergency basis.  The sheriff accepted this argument, overruled the pre-hearing 
panel, and deemed the grandmother to be a relevant person. 
Now, it is well-known that sheriffs cannot overrule decisions of FKLOGUHQ¶VKHDULQJVRU
pre-hearing panels as being not justified just because they disagree with them (the 
jurisprudence on this point is extensive, but in this context see in particular the 
comments on Sheriff Principal Nicholson in W v Schaffer 2001 (S.L.T. (Sh.Ct) 86 at 
87K-88A).   There was no procedural irregularity in the case and so Sheriff 
McCulloch must be holding either that the panel had made an error of law or that no 




The error of law (though it is not explicitly identified as such) seems to be that the 
SDQHO LQDVVHVVLQJ WKHVLJQLILFDQFHRI WKHJUDQGPRWKHU¶V LQYROYHPHQW LQ WKHFKLOG¶V
upbringing, ignored the welfare of the child.  At para. 6 of his judgment Sheriff 
McCulloch says this: ³All decisions relative to a child, including those made by a 
children's hearing, or a pre-hearing panel, or a sheriff, must have at its heart the 
µEHVWLQWHUHVWVRIWKHFKLOG¶ principle. Thus, when looking to see if a person should be 
deemed as a relevant person, and applying the test of significant involvement (past 
or present), the consideration must be made in the light of the child's best interests.´  
He finds it to be in the best interests of the child for the grandmother to be deemed to 
be a relevant person, and so he interprets the s.81(3) test in such a way as achieves 
that result.  
Sheriff McCulloch has form here.  In the far more straight-forward case of X, 
Appellants, 2013 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct) 125, parents challenged a pre-hearing panel¶V
determination that the foster carers who had been looking after their children for the 
previous 18 months satisfied the test for being deemed to be relevant persons.  The 
foster carers had attended previous hearings, they being then within the now 
repeaOHGGHILQLWLRQRI³UHOHYDQWSHUVRQ´ LQVRI WKHChildren (Scotland) Act 1995, 
but since the coming into force of the 2011 Act they could continue to do so only if 
deemed by a pre-hearing panel to be relevant persons.  Holding that the panel were 
correct to find the foster carers to be relevant persons (and that this constituted no 
LQIULQJHPHQW RI WKH SDUHQWV¶ DUWLFOH  ULJKW WR UHVSHFW IRU WKHLU IDPLO\ OLIH 6KHULII
0F&XOORFKVDLGDWSDUDRIKLV MXGJPHQW ³WKHRYHUDUFKLQJSULQFLSOH LV WKHZHOIDUH
test.  Section 25 of the 2011 Act requires all decisions, whether by a sheriff or 
children's hearing or pre-hearing panel, to have regard to the need to safeguard and 
promote the welfare of a child throughout the child's life as the paramount 
consideration. On one view, and indeed it is my view, the child's welfare right trumps 
WKDWRIDSDUHQW
VDUWULJKWZKHUHWKRVHULJKWVDSSHDURWKHUZLVHWRFRQIOLFW´/DWHU
in discussing the pre-KHDULQJSDQHO¶VDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHs.81(3) test, he says (at para 
³%XW any decision taken by a pre-hearing panel must have the child's welfare as 
LWVSDUDPRXQWFRQVLGHUDWLRQ´ 
 
The Flaw in these Cases 
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In X, Appellants, the determination of the pre-hearing panel was plainly right and the 
VKHULII¶VGHFLVLRQ WRFRQILUPWKDWGHWHUPLQDWLRQZDV inevitable.  In M, Appellant, the 
matter was more evenly balanced and there was clearly room for different panels 
reaching different determinations (though that in itself does not justify a sheriff 
quashing the determination).  What is troubling and, in my view, wrong in both 
GHFLVLRQV LV WKH VKHULII¶V UHOLDQFH RQ V DQG WKH FKLOG¶V ZHOIDUH LQ UHDFKLQJ KLV
conclusion as to whether the test in s.81(3) is satisfied. 
Section 25(2) of the 2011 Act UHDGV  ³7KHFKLOGUHQ¶VKHDULQJSUH-hearing panel or 
court is to regard the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child 
WKURXJKRXWWKHFKLOG¶VFKLOGKRRGDVWKHSDUDPRXQWFRQVLGHUDWLRQ´6HFWLRQ5(1) tells 
us that this requirement DSSOLHV³ZKHUHE\YLUWXHRIWKLV$FWDFKLOGUHQ¶VKHDULQJSUH-
KHDULQJSDQHORUFRXUWLVFRPLQJWRDGHFLVLRQDERXWDPDWWHUUHODWLQJWRDFKLOG´2Q
the face of it this seems absolute: the welfare of the child is paramount in any 
decision that requires to be made under the 2011 Act LI WKDWGHFLVLRQ ³UHODWHV WRD
FKLOG´%XWthis does not mean that s.25 governs all decisions made under the 2011 
Act.  CKLOGUHQ¶V KHDULQJV SUH-hearing panels and courts are required to come to 
various different types of decision under the 2011 Act, some of which clearly cannot 
EH GHWHUPLQHG E\ UHJDUGLQJ WKH FKLOG¶V ZHOIDUH DV SDUDPRXQW  A court might, for 
example, be asked to make a decision on the competency of an action (as indeed 
PD\DFKLOGUHQ¶VKHDULQJ$QLQFRPSHWHQWDFWLRQGRHVQRWEHFRPHFRPSHWHQWMXVW
because it is in the interests of the child to take the action and so a determination of 
competency cannot be governed by s.25.  That proposition has judicial authority, in 
the shape of the decision of Lord Menzies in S v Proudfoot 2002 S.L.T. 743.  Here a 
KHDULQJ¶VGHFLVLRQWKDWWKH$FWGLGQRWDOORZWKHPWRVXVSHQGDFRQGLWLRQLQa 
supervision requirement pending an appeal (as opposed to suspending the whole 
requirement) was challenged and Lord Menzies, agreeing that such an action would 
be incompetent, explicitly denied the relevance of s.16 of the 1995 Act (the welfare 
predecessor to s.25 of the 2011 Act) to his decision.  
A competency decision is not the only decision to be made under the 2011 Act to 
ZKLFK WKH FKLOG¶V ZHOIDUH LV QRW GHWHUPLQLQJ RU HYHQ UHOHYDQW  A sheriff, for 
example, might be asked to determine whether a s.67 ground of referral to the 
cKLOGUHQ¶VKHDULQJKDVEHHQHVWDEOLVKHGRUQRW  It would be entirely illegitimate for a 
sheriff to hold, say, that he cannot determine from the evidence whether or not the 
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child has misused alcohol, or has committed an offence, or has failed to attend 
school regularly ± EXWWKDWVLQFHWKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUHUHTXLUHVWKDWthe child be subject 
to a compulsory supervision order he will hold the ground established.  Whether a 
fact exists or not cannot logically be determined E\WKHFRQVHTXHQFHVIRUWKHFKLOG¶V
welfare of that fact.  Nor can the welfare test determine whether or not any of the 
more evaluative s.67 grounds have been established.  If a sheriff is faced with a 
TXHVWLRQ RI ZKHWKHU WKH FKLOG¶V UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK D VFKHGXOH  RIIHQGHU LV D ³FORVH
connectioQ´ IRU WKH SXUSRVHV RI WKH JURXQG LQ VF RU ZKHWKHU WKH FKLOG LV
³OLNHO\´ WR VXIIHU XQQHFHVVDULO\ for the purposes of the ground in s67(2)(a), the 
welfare principle in s.25 is not ± cannot be ± determining.  It might determine 
³VXIIHULQJ´EXWQRW³likelihood´: a ULVNLVPDGHQRPRUH³OLNHO\´MXVWEHFDXVHWKHFKLOG¶V
interests lie in the ground being established; equally, it does not become less likely 
EHFDXVH WKH FKLOG¶V LQWHUHVWV OLH LQ WKH UHIHUUDO EHLQJ GLVFKDUJHG  In other words, 
these decisions of the sheriff are, fundamentally, decisions of fact even when the 
facts require evaluation.  This is very different from the judgment of what to do in 
response to established facts: it is only such matters of judicial or quasi-judicial 
discretion that are governed by s.25(2) ± notwithstanding the apparently all-
encompassing terms of s.25(1). 
So the question becomes: what sort of decision is a pre-hearing panel making when 
it is applying the test in s.81(3)?  The test is clearly not one of competency, nor is it 
one of pure fact.  Rather, when asked to determine whether or not a person has, or 
has recently had, a significant involvement in the upbringing of a child, the pre-
hearing panel is evaluating sometimes contested facts.  How ³significant´ is the 
SHUVRQ¶VLQYROYHPHQW":DVWKHLQYROYHPHQW³recent´?  Did the involvement concern 
matters of ³upbringing´?  These are not susceptible to being answered by reference 
WRWKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUHWKRXJKFOHDUO\WKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUHPLJKW well be affected by the 
decision.  Section 25 does not, in other words, apply to the evaluative determination 
of whether a person meets the test in s.81(3), just as it does not apply to the 
evaluation of the facts that found a s.67 ground.  If the sheriff is not satisfied that a 
s.67 ground has been made out then he must discharge the referral; if a pre-hearing 
panel is not satisfied that the s.81(3) test has been met then it must refuse to deem 
the person a relevant person ± each irrespective of whether it is in the interests of 
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the child to be referred to a hearing, or to be accompanied at the hearing by the 
person in question. 
Welfare works both ways of course.  An individual may seek to be deemed to be a 
relevant person when it would be disastrous for the child so to recognise him, for 
example if the individual is a schedule 1 offender of whom the child is afraid.  Yet if 
the offender shows that he has or has recently had significant involvement in the 
upbringing of the child the pre-hearing panel must (according to s.81(3), and as 
recognised by Sheriff McCulloch in X, Appellants at para.3) deem him to be a 
relevant personDQGWKHIDFWWKDWWKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUHZould be compromised thereby 
does not allow the panel to refuse to do so. 
So, in sum, Sheriff 0F&XOORFK ZDV LW LV VXEPLWWHG ZURQJ WR IRFXV RQ WKH FKLOG¶V
welfare in reaching his decisions in the two cases discussed above.  He clearly 
made the right decision in X, Appellants; he probably made the decision that I would 
have made in M, Appellant (because I want the test in s.81(3) to be interpreted 
expansively).  But the decision was not mine: it belonged to the pre-hearing panel, 
which ought not to have been overturned unless the sheriff determined that an error 
of law had been made or that no reasonable pre-hearing panel would have come to 
the decision in question.  Evaluating facts differently from how the sheriff would 
evaluate them is not, in itself, an error of law.  The error of law lies in using s.25 to 
make the evaluation, and the pre-hearing panel was correct not to do so.  It is to be 
hoped that other sheriffs do not follow the approach in these two cases, and that we 
do not have to wait too long until a higher court firmly rejects that approach. 
 
On a Related Issue 
The 2011 Act gives to the pre-hearing panel the primary role of deeming an 
individual to be a relevant person, but gives it no role in removing deemed relevant 
SHUVRQVWDWXV 2QO\DFKLOGUHQ¶VKHDULQJDIWHUDUHYLHZWKHRXWFRPHRIZKLFK LVWR
maintain the compulsory supervision order, may remove the relevant person status 
of an individual previously deemed as such (2011 Act, s.142).  That will change, 
however, when the recently enacted Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014 
comes into force, because a new s.81A is to be inserted into the 2011 Act permitting 
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a pre-hearing panel to be convened to determine whether a deemed relevant person 
³VKRXOGFRQWLQXHWREHGHHPHGWREHDUHOHYDQWSHUVRQ´7KDW³VKRXOG´PXVWQRWEH
interpreted by regarding the welfare principle in s.25 as determinative.  A person 
³VKRXOG´± E\ZKLFKLVPHDQW³PXVW´± continue to be deemed to be a relevant person 
if they continue to meet the test, even when that is bad for the child.  And they 
should (must) have their relevant person status removed if they now fail to meet the 
test ± even when their continued involvement in the hearing system would be good 
for the child. 
